From disarmament to rearmament:
elements for a sociology of critique of the
Pacification Police Unit Program

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Abstract

Inspired by the reflections on the concept of critique proposed by Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello, this article presents some elements for a sociology of critique of the Pacification Police Unit (Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora - UPPs) program. It offers a brief history of the project, typified in phases. We conduct a mapping and a temporal analysis of critiques made about the UPPs throughout the entire period of their existence from 2008 until today. This analysis is based on ethnographic research and interviews conducted by the authors between 2009 and 2015 in the first two “pacified” favelas in the city of Rio de Janeiro (Santa Marta and the Cidade de Deus), and on the analysis of news reports from the major and alternative media and of social networks.

Key words: urban violence, favelas, pacification, critique.
Do desarmamento ao rearmentamento:
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Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora (UPPs)

Resumo

Inspirados nas reflexões sobre a noção de crítica propostas por Luc Boltanski e Eve Chiapello, apresentaremos neste artigo elementos para elaboração de uma sociologia da crítica às Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora (UPPs). Trata-se de uma tentativa de produzir uma breve história do projeto, tipologizando-a em fases. Ao longo do artigo apresentamos um mapeamento e uma análise temporal das críticas que foram apresentadas às UPPs em todo o período de sua existência - de 2008 até agora. Esta análise é baseada em pesquisas etnográficas e entrevistas realizadas pelos autores entre 2009 e 2015 nas duas primeiras favelas “pacificadas” da cidade do Rio de Janeiro (o Santa Marta e a Cidade de Deus), assim como na análise de notícias publicadas sobre as UPPs nos últimos anos em jornais, meios de comunicação alternativos e redes sociais.

Palavras-chave: violência urbana, favelas, pacificação, crítica.
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Introduction

When the Pacification Police Unit project was launched in late 2008 it was seen by the Rio de Janeiro state government, the media and by much of the city’s population as a light at the end of the tunnel for the problem of “urban violence” (Machado da Silva 2008) in the “marvelous city”. Now that the large events that Rio de Janeiro hosted have passed, however, there is a general consensus that this “proximity policing” project is suffering a general crisis and most of the city’s population believe that the project is over, although its dissolution has not been officially announced.

Inspired by reflections about the influence of the concept of critique that Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello proposed in The New Spirit of Capitalism, in this article we present an outline of a sociology of critique of the Pacification Police Units. This idea of a sociology of critique is linked to the pragmatic sociology of Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot (1991) and to how, in French sociology, this opposes Pierre Bourdieu’s critical sociology of domination to the pragmatic sociology of critique (see Corrêa & De Castro, 2016).

In De la justification, Boltanski and Thévenot propose no longer establishing the task of social critique as the priority role of sociology, as did Bourdieu. They proposed making the critical operations of actors the object of analysis. The passage from a critical sociology to a sociology of critique was based on the formalization and systematization of the critiques made by the actors themselves in critical moments. It is from this general framework that this article intends to develop a sociology of the critique of the Pacification Police Units. That is, the objective is to conduct a formalization and systematization of the critiques that all the actors directly and indirectly involved in the “pacification” project presented over time. In this way, our scope is – based on the critiques that were made of the Pacification Police Units throughout their period of existence - to outline a brief history, outlined in phases, of this “proximity policing” project.

To present this analysis we will conduct a mapping and temporal analysis of the mode of functioning of the critiques of the Pacification Police Units. We can synthesize the implementation of program in the following steps: a) a first moment in which there was a disarming of drug traffickers and a partial incorporation by the new public safety policy of the critiques made of methods of fighting urban violence.

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1 We would like to thank the reviewers from Vibrant who made essential contributions to the revision of this article.
2 In this study we follow the perspective proposed by Machado da Silva (2008, p. 35) to think of urban violence as a collective representation, or more specifically, a representation of practices - threats of plunder of private property and to physical integrity – and of subjectively justified models of conduct. Like Machado da Silva, we begin with the idea that urban violence is a symbolic construction that “constitutes what it describes”. That is, “it is a common sense category of understanding that consolidates and confers meaning to the experience lived in cities” and that instrumentally and morally guides the courses of action that city residents consider to be more convenient in the various situations in which they act.
3 It should be said that the book The New Spirit of Capitalism is located within a more general framework of pragmatic sociology. To better obtain a contextualization of the pragmatic constellation in French sociology see Corrêa and Castro (2016).
that were based on a “war metaphor” (Leite 2012); b) a second moment in which an effective and solid “consensus” was established around the Pacification Police Units; c) a third, in which this consensus, and the consolidation of the project, created an intense difficulty in presenting and finding a space for the expression of certain critiques; d) a fourth moment in which a new critical repertoire began to be formed, although in a fragmented state; e) a fifth in which there was a rise and intensification of new “critical energies” that erupted with the demonstrations of 2013, and when the case of Amarildo channeled these energies; f) finally, the rearming of the “traffic” and of the critique of the Pacification Police Units.

This analysis is based on ethnographic data gathered between 2009 and 2015 in Santa Marta and in the Cidade de Deus – based on field work conducted by the two authors – and in news reports published about the Pacification Police Units in recent years in newspapers, alternative communication media and social networks. It is worth noting that, in addition to participant observation, in depth interviews were conducted in the favelas with residents, police officers and drug dealers.

1. The disarmament of critique and of traffic in the “pacified” areas

Between 2007 and 2008, before the Pacification Police Units were launched, the “urban violence” in Rio de Janeiro was faced by a large portion of the city population as “an unsolvable problem”. “The vicious circle” of violence, always refueled by the public safety policy based on confrontation that had been implemented in the state for decades, appeared to be reaching its peak in the first year of the administration of Governor Sérgio Cabral Filho. José Mariano Beltrame, secretary of security of Rio de Janeiro from 2007 and 2016, indicated that when he took office, “the police in Rio were those who killed the most and died the most”. In the same press conference, he concluded, that “if it is the police that kills the most and also who dies the most, the solution was obvious: “face the confrontation as if it is not the solution” (Beltrame 2014: 78).

The “vicious circle” to which Beltrame refers had been fed for some decades by a “security model based on deadly force as an indicator of efficiency” (Ribeiro, Dias, Carvalho 2008). This model took shape in the 1990s and deepened in the first years of the decade of 2000. Some clues that reveal the deepening of the bellicose concept of public safety policy in beginning of the century was the “banalization” of the use of armored vehicles in the Rio de Janeiro favelas (Ribeiro, Dias, Carvalho 2008), the heavy investments made to increase the ranks of the Special Operations Battalion (Bope) and the Shock Police Battalion (BPCHq), as well as the creation of the Tactical Action Groups (GAT) in the conventional battalions.

Misse, Grillo, Teixeira and Neri (2013) affirm that the intensification of militarization of the police practices, although they have been important to the “affirmation and consolidation of the bellicose superiority of the state in relation to the drug dealing factions” generated a considerable increase in the

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4 The expression “critical energies” is inspired by the use that Gustavo Bezerra makes of it in his doctoral thesis, which not by chance used the book The New Spirit of Capitalism to consider the social question, redemocratization and mobile capitalism in Brazil. See Bezerra, 2012, pp. 72,110; 128; 271).

5 June 2013 was marked by demonstrations and social mobilizations throughout Brazil. Initially called by the Free Fare Movement in São Paulo (Movimento Passe Livre), the protests against increased public transportation fares gained strength and widespread adhesion. Demonstrations quickly spread throughout the country with multiple demands, intensifying to the mobilization of one million people in different cities on June 20. The course of events was a point of inflection in the history of social mobilizations in Brazil. The protests continued in July.

6 Amarildo de Souza was a resident of Rocinha who disappeared in July 2013 after he was seized by police to testify. Although his body was never found, investigations indicate that he was tortured and killed by police. The question “Where’s Amarildo?” became one of the main slogans of the demonstrators who took to the streets in Rio de Janeiro and nearly all Brazilian capitals in June and July of 2013.

7 The Morro Santa Marta favela is located on a steep hillside in the Botafogo neighborhood on the border with Laranjeiras, in the Zona Sul [Southern zone] of the city of Rio de Janeiro. It has an area of 54,692 m² and 6,000 residents, according to the Secretaria de Estado de Segurança (Seseg). Unlike Santa Marta, the Cidade de Deus is not located on a hill. It is flat, and according to the Instituto de Estudos do Trabalho e Sociedade (IETS), is divided into five parts: Karatê; CH Gabinál Margarida; Lazer; Edgar Werneck and Quinze. According to the Instituto Pereira Passos, based on the 2010 census by the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE), Cidade de Deus has 14,472 residences and 47,795 inhabitants in a territory of 2,099,531 m².
deadliness of the police action and in the numbers of “reports of resistance” which peaked in 2007 – when 1,330 cases were recorded in the state (accounting for 18% of all homicides that year) and 902 in the city of Rio de Janeiro.

Ribeiro, Dias & Carvalho (2008) suggest that this growth should be associated to the fact that Sérgio Cabral Filho, in his first year in office, had deepened even more the “confrontation policy” by disseminating, for example, the so-called, “mega-operations” conducted in the favelas. One of the “mega-operations” that gained most visibility at the beginning of the Cabral government was executed in the region known as the Complexo do Alemão, on 27 June 2007, less than one month before the realization of the Pan American Games in Rio de Janeiro. The operation included some 1,200 police officers and resulted in the deaths of 19 people. At the time, Governor Cabral declared “The population is convinced of the need for this confrontation (…). You can’t make an omelet without breaking eggs. (…). There is no other path to take”. A report published by the Special Secretariat of Human Rights of the Presidency of the Republic revealed, for example, that some of the 19 deaths were caused by summary and arbitrary executions that occurred during the police operation.

Since then, the critiques have multiplied not only of that specific operation, but of the entire public safety policy that has been implemented by Cabral. The policy of the “war against trafficking” which was being questioned in various countries, became a target of challenges that pointed out that:

The police actions in the favelas are focused only on the excessive use of force, in summary executions. The proportion between the deaths and arrests and apprehension of drugs and arms during the realization of the “mega-operations” in the favelas indicates the absence of coordinated actions of intelligence and, moreover, that the state action increasingly criminalizes poverty, as if the weapons were manufactured there and the drugs grown there. It ignores the active participation of the police and of other social segments in the organization of criminal networks, like drug and arms trafficking (Ribeiro, Dias, Carvalho 2008: 15).

At this time, a consensus became strengthened, therefore, around the idea that the “war against crime” policy was counterproductive and ineffective (Ribeiro, Dias, Carvalho 2008: 15). All indications were that this deliberate policy of confrontation was not making Rio de Janeiro safer, and was generating a high rate of fatalities and an exaggerated human cost for both the police and the traffickers – not to mention the residents who were victims of “stray bullets”. In addition, there was also a generalized opinion that the “confrontation policy” not only caused enormous disturbance to the lives of city residents in general, and to the favela residents in particular – who had to live with the constant gun battles – it was not able to break the traffickers’ territorial command over the favelas. Even with a repressive security policy based on intermittent confrontations, the “right to come and go”, in the favelas was not guaranteed by the state - the will of the traffickers predominated in these regions.

To obtain longer lasting results in fighting violence in the city – which it must be remembered was preparing to receive the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympic Games – the governor and his secretary of public safety Beltrame, decided to test a new form of police action in these territories. Thus, in November 2008 an experiment was implemented with a new form of policing from which emerged what later became known as the Pacification Police Units (UPPs). The initial test took place with the permanent police occupation of the Morro Santa Marta (Menezes 2015). To the surprise even of those who conceived the project, the results were nearly immediate: the Pacification Police Units were presented as “an excellent opportunity to lower murder and crime rates and change the police culture of confrontation” (Beltrame 2014: 114). Based on this first operational success, the “phase of public persuasion” began as Beltrame

8 “Auto de resistência” or roughly “report of resistance” is the classification that the police give to homicides committed by police officers in service in supposed legitimate defense.
affirmed. This was “public relations work” that involved “more than 150 meetings were held with the press and people influential in public opinion” (Beltrame 2014: 115). This helped the secretary and his staff to gradually confront some of the resistance to the project found within the ranks of the police, the population in general and especially among residents of occupied areas.

The success of the initial implementation together with a work of public persuasion was considerable and a portion of the city population began to see the Pacification Police Units as the “light at the end of the tunnel” for the problem of urban violence in Rio de Janeiro. In its first years of its existence, the project – unlike the previous “permanent occupations” such as the Grupamentos de Policiamento em Áreas Especiais - GPAE [Special Areas Police Groups] (Misse 2010) – was able to garner a broad base of support from: a) the media; b) federal, state and municipal politicians; c) Rio de Janeiro business; d) civil society organizations; and d) most of the city population (including, it must be remembered, a large portion of the residents of the “pacified” favelas).

In addition, academics have also had an important role in this consolidation of the Pacification Police Units. The first studies about the project – like one conducted in 2009 by the Fundação Getulio Vargas, showed that 87% of the people interviewed in Santa Marta and 93% in the Cidade de Deus supported the police actions – serve not only to diagnose the “success” of the new police model, but also helped to construct the consensus around the idea that the UPPs were the best public safety project implemented in recent decades. And not only for those living in the surrounding and “noble” neighborhoods of the city, but also – and particularly – for the residents of the favela territories. The results of various studies conducted about the project, until 2012, list the following elements as indicators of the success of the Pacification Police Units:

a) The disarmament of traffickers in the “pacified” favelas – or at least, the reduction of the ostensive presence of weapons by actors other than the police – which associated to the strong decrease in the sporadic police incursions and gun battles, led to a drastic reduction in homicides and armed violence in general, not only within the favelas but also in the surroundings (Cano, Borges, Ribeiro 2012);

b) The reduction of the arbitrary actions and violence by the police in the areas where the Pacification Police Units were operating (Machado da Silva 2010). This was related to “greater internal and external social control, over the corruption and abuse of power practiced by the police” in the “pacified” territories (Musumeci et al. 2013)

c) The drop in the number of “reports of resistance” (Misse, Grillo, Teixeira, Neri 2013: 9), which appears to indicate that the Pacification Police Units could help to “civilize” the police or that it could become a “policy for protection of the population against the police itself and the high degree of lethality of the police incursions” (Misse 2014: 682);

d) the greater freedom to come and go of the residents that, as a whole, wound up significantly improving the sense of security among the residents directly affected by the UPPs (Musumeci et al. 2013; IBPS 2009; CECIP 2010; Souza & Silva 2010; Burgos et al. 2012; Cano, Borges, Ribeiro 2012; Oliveira; Abramovay 2012; Rodrigues; Siqueira 2012; Serrano-Berthet 2013);

e) the expansion of the positive expectations about safety for the entire population of the city, including a good portion of the residents in locations targeted for their implementation in the future and even the wealthy segments who do not need (or want) the Pacification Police Units where they live (Machado da Silva 2010).

All of these indicators help to reinforce the idea that “after more than three decades of failed experiments in public safety programs in Rio de Janeiro”, the Pacification Police Units appeared as “a successful response to the issue of violence in this state, especially in the capital” (Burgos et al. 2012: 2).
As Barbosa suggested (2012: 257), at the beginning of the project there was a collective perception that it was possible to “raise the volume and say that, since the urban and sanitary reform of Mayor Pereira Passos (with the demolition of tenements and poor residences in the center of the city in the early twentieth century) and the removal of the favelas in the 1960s and 1970s” few government actions had produced such a significant impact on the lives of residents of the city of Rio de Janeiro as the Pacification Police Units were generating.

2. The consensus around the UPPs

With the reduction of mortalities, support from residents of the favelas and from the “asphalt”, that is, non favela residents, news reports promoting the benefits of the project, financial backing from private businesses, in addition to support from the municipal, state and federal governments, the “success” of the project was proudly celebrated. At the time, various residents regularly affirmed that those who dared to criticize the project were either immediately seen as defenders of the drug dealers or were at the least treated as unreasonable.

But it is appropriate to ask exactly why and how did this take place? We think that the outline of a sociology of critique of the Pacification Police Units can help this task. We are inspired by the reflections that Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello made about the role of critique in the transformation of capitalism. We begin with the idea that the initial consensus established around the Pacification Police Units project was due to its capacity to incorporate, even if partially, some of the main critiques that had been made of public safety policy in Rio de Janeiro state in recent decades. In this sense, we argue that the consensus is a result of the fact that the “pacification” policy was, at least at first, an effective response to the critique that were made of the current public safety policy based on a “war metaphor”.

Our main argument is that the public safety policy based the Pacification Police Units, when it was able to reduce the repeated interruptions of routine life, the gun battles, the violent deaths, the ostensive presence of arms, and thus strongly limit the command that the traffickers had of the favela territories – that is, the main elements around which the “representation of urban violence” (Machado da Silva 2008) was based – it was capable of disarming not only the traffic, but also the main critiques that had been made of the public safety policy that had been based on the logic of confrontation. For this reason, we maintain that the establishment of a consensus about the project – which some news reports came to call the “miracle” of the police pacification projects – was joined by a disarmament of the critiques that were aimed at the former public safety policy.

To better express our argument, we believe it is important to review what Boltanski and Chiapello identify in their joint work – The New Spirit of Capitalism – as the impacts of critique on the process of transformation of the capitalist system. The authors affirm that critique can generally have three types of impacts and consequences. A first possible effect concerns the ability that the critique may have to delegitimize and remove the effectiveness of that which it criticizes. By proposing a history of capitalism in three phases, each one doted with a “spirit” (in a deliberate allusion to the work of Max Weber), Boltanski and Chiapello strive to show how critiques were important for delegitimizing certain models of capitalism – the later defined by the authors as a form of obtaining unlimited profits by peaceful means. Thus, critique, according to the authors, had been an essential actor capable of requiring the capitalist system to innovate and produce new forms of engagement, adhesion and legitimation for its perpetuation.

In the case of the Pacification Police Units, we argue that the critiques aimed at the confrontational policing model helped to expose the ineffectiveness of the recurrent violent incursions. At the same time, the critiques pointed to the need to develop another form of policing that, in many aspects, is
similar to “pacification policing”. These initial critiques aimed at the security policy based on the logic of confrontation and the “war metaphor” (Leite 2012), by indicating both the ineffectiveness as well as the high human cost of the recurring violent incursions, exposed the need for a new form of policing that would be less violent and more effective.

A second effect of critique that Boltanski and Chiapello call attention to is that it requires those at whom the critique is aimed to justify themselves in terms of the common good. In this case, when the response of those in the name of whom the critique is aimed is not reduced to mere “empty words”, but is based on concrete actions whose effectiveness later become unquestionable, Boltanski and Chiapello said that there are two consequences. On one hand, there is an incorporation, even if partial, of a part of the values on which the critique is based. As an example, they mention how to perpetuate European capitalism and diminish the strong social critique made of it in the late 19th and early twentieth centuries, elements of this critique were partially incorporated to government policies, and established what later became known as the social welfare state. The consequence of this, however, is that social critique does not pass unscathed through this incorporation: “the price that the critique must pay for being heard, at least partially, is to see that some of the values it mobilized to oppose the form assumed by the process of [capitalist] accumulation were placed at the service of this accumulation” (Boltanski, Chiapello 2009: 63). According to Boltanski and Chiapello, the price paid by the social critique for having been partially incorporated by capitalism in the social welfare state was, therefore, its temporary demobilization – or in the terms that we raise here, its disarmament.

In the case of the Pacification Police Units, the price paid by the social movements, the researchers, militants and residents who struggle for the cause of human rights and for a less violent and repressive police, was to see the Rio de Janeiro state government and its secretariat of public safety defend itself by adopting part of the discourse used to criticize it. After all, since the beginning, one of the main issues of the “pacification” police project was the idea that its model of policing was based on less violent police operations that would be closer to the local population; a mode of policing that sought effectiveness not through increased repression, but through the approximation and reduction of the rates of homicide and violent deaths. These elements raised until then by the critics of security policy based on the “war metaphor”, due to its partial incorporation by the “pacifying” police apparatus, then came to be used by the state itself to defend its action. We thus affirm that this was one of the fundamental elements for the establishment of the “consensus” around the Pacification Police Units, the reason the state was able to disarm, that is, produce a temporary incapacitation of a large portion of the critiques that was aimed at it until then.

Still in relation to capitalism, Boltanski and Chiapello refer to a third possible impact of the critique. In this case, they say that it involves

A much less optimistic analysis in terms of the reactions of capitalism. This is because it can be supposed that under certain conditions, capitalism can escape the demands to reinforce measures for social justice, making it more difficult to decipher, ‘shuffling the cards’. According to this possibility, the response to the critique does not lead to establishing more just measures. By producing a transformation, in the case of capitalism, of the forms of realization of profit, the world became momentarily unorganized in relation to the previous references and in a state of great illegibility (Boltanski, Chiapello 2009: 63). [Translated from a Portuguese edition.]

In the case of the initial period of the implementation of the Pacification Police Units, this third element is unquestioned: if on one hand, there was an effective process of partial incorporation of the critiques of the security policy that was based on the logic of confrontation, followed by effective
responses like the reduction in gun battles and violent deaths, on the other, this new policing project, at least in its first months and years, established a zone of indetermination for which new critiques still did not have clear anchorage points. The new forms of repression and the new problems established by the recently implemented “pacification” measure called for the development of a new critical repertoire. With the “shuffling of the cards” established by the initial post-“pacification” situation, the new critiques that had been in formation for a long time, remained sparse, dispersed and fragmented. In this stage of indetermination in which, by means of an activity of inquiry, to use the famous expression of John Dewey (1998), the actors sought to understand what was happening and based on this, develop a critical repertoire suitable to the new problems, it was not possible to define a collective common cause – a fact that, as we will see, only effectively took place after the mass demonstrations in Brazil of June 2013, and particularly after the notorious Amarildo case.

At the initial moment of the installation of the Pacification Police Units, everything took place as if the old critical repertoire, organized and based on a certain state of things ruled by the logic of the intermittent violent incursions by the police, came to operate in a void. Not by chance, some residents and community leaders, at the time of implementation of a new form of policing, frequently said they were “on slippery ground” unsure how to react. Despite the game of interpretations and multiplicity of definitions about the Pacification Police Units, a single and large consensus appeared to permeate the heterogeneous positions of the actors at this time: the arrival of the “pacification” measure had produced unquestionable changes in the favela environment, establishing new zones of indetermination, zones which the previous sensitive and critical repertoire was not prepared to handle.⁹

Below, we will present a mapping of how this new critical repertoire of the Pacification Police Units was gradually forming during the first three years of the implementation of the pacification apparatus, and how institutional responses were appearing to the critiques of the project.

3. Formation of a new critical repertoire

In 2009, when the project began to be developed and expanded, residents of both Santa Marta and the Cidade de Deus – the first “pacified” favelas – mentioned the reduction of violent deaths and gun battles as unquestionable benefits brought by the Pacification Police Units. Nevertheless, after the first year of the project the informal conversations that we had in the field revealed a certain uneasiness by the part of our interlocutors in relation to the disparity between their experience lived as residents of the favela territory and that which was being reported in the media and in official government propaganda about the impacts of the project. While a new critical repertoire was being formed in the Brazilian and international newspapers and on news broadcast on television and on the internet, the Pacification Police Units appeared only as an unquestionable “success”. Until 2011, there was no news about conflicts and problems in the “pacified” areas.

⁹ As our ethnographic data indicate, the permanent police occupation of Santa Marta and the Cidade de Deus reconfigured the routine environment to which the favela residents were accustomed. When this happened, the first territories “pacified” momentaneously became scenes unfamiliar to the residents who lived there and to the traffickers who had operated there for years. These new scenes became established as true centers of indetermination with which the residents did not exactly know how to deal, given that they no longer had the repertoires and measures needed to evaluate the situation and to “gauge the mood” of the favela, to use the expression of Cavalcanti (2008). The actors old common and spontaneous repertoires and tactical forms of evaluation of the local atmosphere was no longer capable of accounting for the new situation. For this reason, a new “education of attention” (Gibson 1979; Ingold 2000) was required, that is, a new modality for tuning the resident’s perceptive system to the environment was needed so they could navigate the sensitive ecology of the favela after the “pacification”. This influenced the difficulty of formation of a new critical repertoire based on new problems that arose with the implementation of the pacifying apparatus. After all, how is it possible to criticize that which is (still) not known?
In the words of one resident of the Cidade de Deus: “we who live here, we don’t live as statistics, no. We who live in the favela know that the UPP brought many benefits, but not everything that they say in the news is true. We are living in somewhat of a factoid”.¹⁰

In different ways, our interlocutors indicated that there appeared to be a great discrepancy between the way that they experienced and lived the Pacification Police Units and how the project was portrayed by the media or how it was presented in public debate. There was a gap between the daily lives of those who lived in the favela environment and the media reports that progressively intensified over the two first years of the project. If it is true that the initial success of the Pacification Police Units not only disarmed the critiques that compose the old critical repertoire around the security policy based on the logic of war, and obtained support and adhesion of a large portion of the favela residents, it is also true that, over time, these same residents came to diagnose a new set of problems that the “major media” and the government seemed to want to ignore. There was a progressive increase of the collective perception among residents in the pacified areas that the government only promotes the information that it wants to, and that the “major media” complies in the process.

During the field work, we systematized these critiques that appeared in the statements of our interlocutors, some in the form of rumors:¹¹

It is important to emphasize that the critical repertoire initially formed did not remain static. The Pacification Police Unit, as a process of permanent experimentation, was producing new problems and new transformations. New critiques arose, some of which was partially incorporated by the “pacification” apparatus and part of which simply ignored. We understand, as will become clear below, that those critiques that the Pacification Police Units were able to incorporate help to corroborate and maintain the initial consensus described above; those that the pacification apparatus was not able to incorporate, help to support and strengthen the critical energies that, as we will see, would erupt in 2013.

¹⁰ The same idea appears in the words of other residents of Santa Marta: “Those from the outside, who watch television think that its wonderful, that we love living here. [They get] an impression of happiness, that the residents are well. The media gives a false sense of peace. But in reality, only those who live here know how hard it is to get by here, know how difficult it is”. (Portion of interview with a Santa Marta resident).

¹¹ These rumors were analyzed as “improvised news” (Shibutani 1966), that can arise both in situations marked by drastic changes in the environment and by uncommon events that suddenly break the routine of a certain group (Menezes 2015).
From this first formation of a critical repertoire, it is up to us to question which critiques have been incorporated by the measure of pacification? In the first year of installation of the Pacification Police Units, many of the critiques referred to a lack of dialog between the police and the population. This, in turn, was partially responded to – thus disarmed – from the moment at which the commanders of the Pacification Police Units came to organize community meetings to debate various issues with residents (Davies 2014).

The use of excessive and arbitrary force by the police also came to compose this new critical repertoire of the residents of the first pacified favelas. Nevertheless, after the initial phase of adaptation of the pacification program passed as police activity in the favela developed a routine, the police operations came to have a more selective focus and took place less frequently. There was, therefore, a momentary accommodation of the conflicts between the police, residents and drug dealers. This accommodation was seen by many people as a success of the policing implemented by the Pacification Police Units, given that the police, as one resident of the Cidade de Deus said in 2011, “had learned to deal better with the population”.

Another important critique that was partially responded to in this first moment concerned how the state was articulating the “arrival of the social programs” in these territories. Not only did the residents complained about social issues, the police from the Pacification Police Units did as well. This was even one of the main problems raised by Beltrame. In any case, all of the police indicated that the delay in the arrival of the social investments promised to harm their work on the hillside, given that “everything fell in the lap of the police” and was placed “on the account of the Pacification Police Units”. In 2010 the government tried to respond to this critique by creating the Social UPP – whose name was changed in 2014, to Rio Mais Social [A more social Rio].

In addition to criticizing the deficit of social investments, in 2010 and 2011, residents of the “pacified” favelas came to incorporate new questions to their critical repertoire that did not gain responses. For example, the rise of new insecurities in “times of peace”, as well as the increased cost of living and of real estate speculation in “pacified” favelas. Another new insecurity that came to inhabit the new critical repertories and was not responded to was related to the increase in non-lethal crimes. The sensation of an increase in robbery and rape in the “pacified” areas stimulated an intensification of critiques of the policing conducted by the Pacification Police Units.

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12 See http://brasil.estadao.com.br/noticias/rio-de-janeiro,a-upp-fez-sua-parte-para-onde-foi-a-verba-de-assistencia-social,10000053273
13 It should be mentioned that, nevertheless, in May 2011, Beltrame declared publically that he did not like the name given to the Social Pacification Police Units. In an interview with the newspaper O Globo, the secretary affirmed to be against the name because, in his opinion, the Pacification Police Units were not social, given that they sought to allow improvements in social conditions. He added that “in addition to this, if the Social Pacification Police Units does not come about you can take me with it. And I don’t want that”.
14 But it is important to say that some of the critiques made against the action of the pacification police also did not find resonance, not even with the majority of the population of the “pacified” favelas. This is indicated by the statement of the president of the Residents Association of Santa Marta: “when they brought the [TV] cameras, we made a big movement, some leaders and the community itself did not appear. (...) In our intervention before the cameras I think that I did not see more than 20 residents. At the funk intervention, I did not see 15 people. (...) So, I don’t understand, I still don’t understand”. Since they perceived that a large part of the population did not seem to be disturbed by the cameras, with the prohibition of the dances in the favela and even with the action of the pacification units in the favela, the leaders decided to change their discourse. Even those who had more emphatically criticized the police action in the favela decided to “change the focus” by understanding that there was no point to, as one resident of Santa Marta said ficar “swimming against the current”. Some of the residents and leaders thus resolved to stop speaking about the pacification units publically and make critiques of the policing (Menezes 2015).
4. The rearming of the critique and of trafficking

In November 2010, the pacification project reached Vila Cruzeiro and the region known as the complexo do Alemão. The scene of bandits from the Vila Cruzeiro escaping to Alemão circulated throughout the world and was broadcast on Brazil’s main television news programs. It was a turning point in the pacification process. As Beltrame stated later: this event was “a watershed in the history of public safety in the state”. In exactly the same place at which in 2002 drug dealers tortured and assassinated a reporter from the nation’s leading television station Rede Globo, Tim Lopes, the police were now victorious. It was a triumph of peace over war; a victory of the forces of the state over the arbitrary domination of the narco-traffickers. In the words of Beltrame: “the victory of Alemão was resounding” and “proved that it was the state who commanded the territory” (2014: 145).

Paradoxically, the peak of the project was, as can be seen in the parabola below, the beginning of the phase of decreasing consensus that had been established about the Pacification Police Units. It was precisely with the occupation of the larger and more complex favelas that some of the old problems – which at least in the pacified favelas appeared to have been definitively eliminated, such as gun battles and violent deaths - gradually returned to the scene.

But it was particularly after 2011 that there was a progressive and gradual intensification of a rearming of the critique of the UPPs. Old promises that were not fulfilled, various critiques towards which the pacification apparatus was insensitive and the resurgence of old problems began to feed the critical energies. Five motives should be presented: a) the delay of the arrival and the inefficiency of the implementation of the social programs in the favelas with the Pacification Police Units; b) the rise of new insecurities in “times of peace”, such as the fear of gentrification and of the increase of non-lethal crimes in “pacified” areas; c) the relaxation of policing in the favelas that had been pacified for a longer period,
where there began to be increased corruption and strengthening of the traffic; d) the accelerated expansion of the project to larger and more complex favelas in which the police found much more resistance and difficulty; e) the case of Amarildo and the demonstrations of July 2013.

The changes in policing in the “pacified” favelas that began to be noted between the end of 2010 and the beginning of 2011 were related to the fact that the police apparatus in the favela territories had established a routine. With the adaptation of the traffic to the new context, allied to the mutual mapping among bandits and police, there was a slackening of the ostensive work of the police. Since then, there was an increase in the critiques that indicated the fact that the police from the Pacification Police Units were not displaying an effort to prevent and deter crimes, and were even not demonstrating, as one resident of Santa Marta said, “willingness to go after and capture” those who are “involved” with drug sales in the favelas. This “disinterest” appears to be accompanied by speculations according to which, on one hand, there would be a progressive return to old practices like the “bribery” and “extortion”; and on the other, the residents observed that the “return to corruption” would be collaborating to the (re)fortification of drug trafficking.

Until early 2011, the comments about police corruption and the rearming of traffickers, who were carry guns again in some “pacified” favelas, establishing fixed points of sale of drugs and committing violent acts within the favela (such as killing and beating residents) only circulated mouth to mouth and was not highlighted in the media. In mid 2011, news reports began to proliferate about gun battles and violent deaths of residents, traffickers and police in favelas with the Pacification Police Units – in both those where the “pacification” had been consolidated and particularly in recently “pacified” areas.

Another aspect that helped to weaken the consensus about the success of the Pacification Police Units was the increase in the number of homicides in the “pacified” favelas. Thus, old problems that were raised in the critical repertoire from before the pacification program, had returned. On June 15, 2011, new reports highlighted the first register of a “report of resistance” killing in an action of Pacification Unit police. The case involved police from the Pacification Police Unit in Pavão-Pavãozinho. Ten days later, another case of violence in a favela with a Pacification Police Unit gained space in the Rio de Janeiro media. Police were patrolling in the favela of Coroa, when they were hit by a grenade thrown by traffickers. One of the officers who participated in the patrol had to have his legs amputated after the attack.

As in this case, various other attacks on police arose in the following months, questioning the possibility to sustain the occupations and the effectiveness of the Pacification Police Units. At the same time, there was a significant increase in accusations of corruption. In September 2011, police from the Pacification Police Units in the favela of Fallet were arrested and charged with corruption in the favela.

The doubts about the sustainability of the project gained strength in 2012 with the inauguration of the pacification units in large favelas, like the Complexo do Alemão, Vila Cruzeiro and Rocinha. Between 2012 and 2013, there was a significant increase in the number of UPPs inaugurated in the city. Ten new Pacification Police Units were inaugurated in 2012 alone, as can be seen in the table below. It is important to note that this expansion of the project took place mostly in large favelas, which are difficult to control and much more hostile and resistant to a permanent police presence.

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15 “André Lima Cardoso, 19, was shot and killed by soldiers from a UPP early Sunday morning (…). There are different versions about what caused the death of the youth and how it all happened. His mother said that André did not use drugs, did not have weapons and was employed (…). The police said that the youth was found in a suspicious position with two other men. According to the police report, André had shot at one of the soldiers. (…) The crime was registered by the soldiers of the Pacification Police Unit as a homicide in a ‘report of resistance’, (Passage of News report “Youth killed with shot in the back by police in UPP in Rio de Janeiro” presented on the national morning news program Bom Dia Brasil 15 June 2011)

During the fieldwork, we heard residents and police criticize this accelerated expansion of the project. They indicated that the government was “going beyond its capacity” by rushing to inaugurate new police pacification units simply to follow the schedule of reaching 40 units in 2014, to prepare the city for the World Cup and, two years later, for the Olympic Games. It was said that in this way the “pacification” process would be losing in terms of quality all that it was gaining in quantity.\(^\text{17}\)

In these locations, the armed conflicts were constantly in the news. In July 2012, there was large repercussion in the news from the first death of an on-duty police officer in a “pacified” favela.\(^\text{18}\) In the following months, there were new confrontations and new deaths of police. In December 2012, there were five deaths and charges of corruption in the “pacified” hillsides proliferated, as in that of Coroa and Providência. At this time, references began to appear in the media of a supposed crisis in the police pacification units. At first, the state government tried to deny this, as indicated in the report “There is no crisis in the UPPs” presented on the Portal IG on 13 September 2011:

The Secretary of Security of Rio de Janeiro State, José Mariano Beltrame, affirmed on Monday (12) that there is no crisis in the police pacification units (UPPs), (...). He said that the military police involved in the bribery scheme will be removed for this infraction (...) “There is no crisis (in the UPPs) It does not exist. There have been 40 years or more of islands of violence and we are entering and staying in these places. I never sold an illusion, and never will, that we do not have problems, but it is essential that it continues. We cannot lose strength”.

In early 2012, four years after the inauguration of the police pacification project, the critical energies were renovated and intensified. New events allowed articulating demands that began to directly affect the project. As Boltanski and Chiapello (2009) indicate as one of the possible effects of critique, this required that spokesmen for the state – in this case the state secretary of public safety and the governor – to publically justify the security program in terms of the common good. The consensus about the pacification

\(^{17}\) During an interview in 2013, one officer from a UPP defined the situation by saying that “it is now a bit of a factory. Every three minutes a UPP is inaugurated (...). The Complexo do Alemão was the headquarters for trafficking, you cannot put the police there and have everyone accept it overnight”.

\(^{18}\) “The soldier Fabiana Aparecida de Souza died after being shot with a 762 rifle in an attack on the Pacification Police Unit in the community of Nova Brasilia (...). This was the first death of an on-duty police officer in a pacified community. The bullet that killed the officer had pierced her vest”. (Portion of article “Death of Office in UPP returns fear and tension to the Complexo do Alemão” published in the Jornal do Brasil 24 July 2012.)
units began to fall apart with the rise of each critique that revived the old repertoire, like the ineffectiveness of the police in disarming the traffickers, the progressive return of arbitrary police actions, the increase in deaths attributed to “report of resistance”, the restriction of freedom to come and go, the return of the gun battles, deaths and cases of corruption in “pacified” areas. As the efficacy of the “pacifying” operation declined, the greater the critical energies were revived and intensified.

Nevertheless, it is possible to say that the definitive rearming of critique took place with the case of the disappearance of Amarildo and the tremendous repercussion that it generated for having occurred at a time at which large demonstrations were taking place in nearly all the Brazilian capitals.

The month of June 2013 was marked by demonstrations and social mobilizations throughout Brazil. Originally convoked by the Free Fare Movement (Movimento Passe Livre) in São Paulo, the demonstrations against the increase in public transportation fares gained mass adhesions, and large demonstrations rapidly spread throughout the country and had multiple agendas. The course of events revealed itself to be a point of inflection in the history of social mobilizations in Brazil (Gohn 2014).

In June, the demonstrations were so intense that they came to mobilize one million people in a single day (June 20). The demonstrations continued in July and some residents of the “pacified” areas, stimulated by the critical energy present in the city, began to organize demonstrations in their neighborhoods. On July 8, Santa Marta residents protested in the streets of Botafogo to express their dissatisfaction over the distortion between the image sold of the favela and the daily experience on the hillside. In the demonstration, the residents demanded a “favela that is a model of truth not cosmetics”.

Initially, at the demonstrations held in June and early July in Rio de Janeiro, critiques of the Pacification Police Units were more discrete, and were only one of the issues raised by some of the demonstrators. In mid July, however, the critiques of the pacification units were no longer one of many issues raised by a few demonstrators and gained resounding visibility after Amarildo de Souza’s disappearance. This construction worker and resident of Rocinha disappeared in July 2013 after being taken by police to testify at one of the offices of the pacification units of Rocinha. Although Amarildo’s body was never found, strong indications gradually arose that the police from the pacification units from Rocinha had tortured and killed the construction worker.

Because his seizure and disappearance occurred at a time when large demonstrations were taking place throughout the country and in which the action of the police had been highly criticized because of the excesses committed during the protests, the Amarildo case generated national commotion. The question “Where’s Amarildo?” became one of the main cries of demonstrators after July. Due to the pressure exercised by the population in the streets, on social media and by well-known celebrities, the secretary of public safety and the governor appeared personally in public a number of times to explain what happened.19

In these responses, the Governor Sérgio Cabral always affirmed that this was an isolated case, and that “the Amarildo case is not the mark of the UPP”.20

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19 On September 6, 2013, the Coordinators for the Pacification Police (CPP) announced an exchange in the command of 25 of the 34 UPPs. The official justification was the “need to ‘oxygenate’ the UPP program. But, this was obviously an attempt to respond to the critiques of the UPPs, especially after it was proved that the commander of the Rocinha UPP was involved in Amarildo’s death. Soon afterwards, in October 2013, the state attorney general filed charges in court that indicated that the torture of Amarildo de Souza was a routine practice by the military police in the Rocinha UPP.

20 Moreover, the governor argued that the very demand for the appearance of Amarildo indicated the advances made by the pacification policy, given that, before the pacification project, this was a common practice by the police. Nevertheless, as the investigations advanced it became clear that the event was not an exception even under the new program, but a much more common practice than imagined and spoken of publically.
5. The end of consensus and the polarization of the critique of the UPPs

The Amarildo case opened space for a broad questioning of the UPPs. According to the sociology of the critique of the Pacification Police Units, which we propose, it was the mark, even a “turning point” (see Abbott 2001; Chateauraynaud, 2011) that produced a definitive break of consensus around the success of the “pacification” project. Since then, the critiques made of the police pacification units were polarized in two extremes. This established a dispute between those who defended that the continuity of the Pacification Units should be guaranteed, although with reforms that sought to insure the results that the Pacification Units had obtained since its beginning; and those who called for an end to the project. This would be equivalent to the polarization that Boltanski and Chiapello (2009) called a reformist critique (which sought to perfect the internal elements of the criticized apparatus) and a radical critique (according to which the very apparatus as a whole must be challenged).

The government representatives themselves and the most enthusiastic supporters of the Pacification Units assumed a reformist position. After July 2013, they publicly recognized that, although the project had many positive qualities, it should be adjusted. For example, in late 2013 Beltrame affirmed in an interview: “we will have to make some of these adjustments on this route, but we have many more positive than negative results”. Nevertheless, he maintained the reasoning according to which those who criticized the police work were directly collaborating with the (re)fortification of the Rio de Janeiro drug traffickers. And he thus associated the rearming of the critique of the police pacification units to the rearming of traffickers.

Beltrame stated, for example, that “the questioning of a police officer is the sign that the dealers need to return” and indicated that “part of the conflicts that we see today in the larger communities are related to the vacuum of authority that these crises provoke” (2014: 176).

During the fieldwork, we heard police affirming that they feared that this entire process of questioning the Pacification Units would have an impact even in smaller favelas, where the “pacification” was more “stabilized”. Capitan Márcio Rocha, commander of the Pacification Unit of Santa Marta, for example, affirmed that:

The Amarildo case, in particular, gives me a certain lack of confidence (...) Suddenly an event that takes place here, there was a fight, there was an arrest by an officer of a person who did not obey and then that person goes, films, puts it on Youtube and that takes on proportions because there is already a trend for people to not trust, or think that the police are arbitrary, that the operation does not work, then... The apprehension becomes much more mine, a much greater concern that the project does not become discredited. (Portion of an interview with Captain Rocha, conducted on 31 July 2013)

We have heard some residents from the “pacified” favelas asserting that the weakening of the image of the pacification units also generated great insecurity among them. Some of our interlocutors speculated more incisively once again about the “long life” of the project:

This question of demonstration, brought us a tremendous lack of confidence. Why? We all know, even if many of the residents of the Cidade de Deus do not understand politics, they understand that the UPP is a political project. It’s a beautiful gol for Sérgio Cabral, right? Lula brought the Family Grant program, PAC, Sérgio Cabral came with the UPP and with the UPA. Then there is that concern of ours about when Sérgio Cabral leaves. Garotinho takes over and he has a dispute with Cabral. Will he want to continue the program? You know that everything in the UPP is rented. Rented patrol cars, the container is rented, the computer is rented, its all rented. We know this, we know that the project can be terminated at any moment. So we try to keep that distance (from the police) because we are reprehended (by the traffickers). (Portion of interview with resident of the Cidade de Deus)

The fear of the dissolution of the police pacification units reached not only residents of the “pacified” favelas, but also artists, business people, athletes, professionals and social entities that had publically defended the project in the second half of 2013. A group of city residents decided to create a “protection network” for the pacification units as indicated in the article in the O Globo newspaper of August 24, 2013. They launched the “Leave Rio at Peace” movement, which arouse as a reaction to the “traffickers attacks” on the offices of AfroReggae in the Complexo do Alemão in late July.

But, beyond the reformist position, a movement of radical critique also gained strength in the wake of the demonstrations in 2013. This is where the movement “UPP, 5 years is enough” came into play. This slogan was created by members of social movements and favela residents who defended the idea that the pacification units should be terminated. One of the arguments they used against the project was that it was not universal, and thus only caused a migration of criminality and violence to areas of the city with less visibility. Moreover, for many it was only a new form of militarization of territories of oppressed populations (Fleury 2012), whose final goal was merely the creation of conditions to advance markets and neo-liberalism (Freeman 2012).
Favela residents, militants and intellectuals that supported the end of the UPPs declared that the project could not be considered an advance in the city’s public safety policy. They affirmed that the Pacification Units had not been developed to guarantee the safety of favela residents but to “protect the non favela residents and the tourists for the arrival of the games [the Olympics and the World Cup]. The policy came from the top down to prepare the city. It is one more brutal and enlightened form of racism by the state that treats the favela as criminal and violent”, declared journalist Gizele Martins, a resident of Maré in the article “Enough of racism and 5 years of the UPP”, published in the community paper O Cidadão on December 2, 2013.

In 2014, the movement to end the pacification units gained even more strength with the new deaths of residents in the “pacified” favelas killed by police from the pacification units. One person killed was Douglas Rafael da Silva Pereira, from the Pavão-Pavãozinho region, who was a dancer on the program broadcast nationally by Rede Globo, Esquenta.

This division between a reformist position and a more radical position that appeared with the end of the consensus around the police pacification units was also clear in the electoral campaign of 2014. Since none of the gubernatorial candidates (including Pezão, who was already governor at the time) defended terminating the pacification units, many of those who adhered to the radical critique cast null ballots [voting is mandatory in Brazil]. Not by chance, the campaign “Don’t vote, struggle!” gained force on social media during the elections, and encouraged a null or blank votes, alleging that none of the candidates recognized the movement against the “pacification”. On the other hand, those who took the reformist position that the project should be changed and improved wound up assuming one of the possible candidacies – and the election of Pezão, despite the problems that the UPP presented, can be seen as support for the security policy, especially considering that he won in the electoral zones occupied by the “pacification” police.22

Even after Pezão’s victory, the project did not recover its previous stability and the indeterminations in relation to the future of the police pacification units only increased. Two main factors contributed to this. On one hand, the horizon of expectation of the pacification policy was basically defined since its beginning: the large events, such as the World Cup and the Olympic games. Since the start, many residents said that the pacification units could not last after the Olympics. And when the games were over, there was considerable uncertainty about what would happen to the pacification units. On the other hand, the fiscal crisis of Rio de Janeiro state also intensified. In this context, some units that had been announced, like one in the complex of Maré, were canceled. In addition, the bonuses paid to the police were terminated as well as private investments in the program.

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Beyond the scarcity of material resources, there was also a symbolic resignification of the project. The belief in the possibility of pacification was waning to the extent that Roberto Sá, the new secretary of public safety who succeeded José Mariano Beltrame, stated in May 2017 that the police pacification units had been a “too daring” project. Moreover, the secretary affirmed that the choice of the term “pacification” had been a mistake, given that it had generated “unfair demands” on the police units, and soon after declared that the pacification program “was a dream. A utopia for those who believed”.

From 2014 until 2017, all of the successful reductions in crime rates attained, like those presented at the beginning of this article, have progressively been undone. There has been an increase in gun battles, violent deaths, stray bullets, robbery and assaults in the regions near the police pacification units. The entire critical repertoire used to question the public safety policy before the pacification units became useful once again and to make sense. This partially explains the use by some residents of the pacified areas of the common expression: “everything is going back to how it was before”.

If at the beginning of their implementation the pacification units presented a “light at the end of the tunnel” for the problem of urban violence, it now appears that the old miracle had been incapable of convincing people to believe in it. The crime rates grew considerably once again in Rio de Janeiro state.23 And if until 2014 Beltrame affirmed that it was “too early for greater judgments” and that “it is not just the numbers that evaluate the result” (2014: 181), two years later the public safety statistics were even worse and the critiques of police violence only increased exponentially.

Currently, even those who since 2013 adhered to the reformist critiques are skeptical of the ability of the project to once again have the results of the first years of the “pacification”. To make matters worse, it is now no longer only the larger more complex regions with higher population density like the complexes of Alemão and Rocinha that have suffered from violent deaths and gun battles, but even the smaller favelas, like the so-called: model favela”, Santa Marta.

In late May 2015, after the first gun battle that took place in this “model favela” since the inauguration of the police pacification unit, Governor Luiz Fernando Pezão declared that the episode “would not destabilize the pacification process”. The declaration, however, did not appear to find resonance among the majority of the population of the city’s favelas that no longer appeared to believe that the police pacification units could bring and maintain the peace as promised. As one resident of Santa Marta affirmed in an interview with the news portal G1 on March 29, 2015: “I have seen armed bandits, minors, working for the traffickers, “playboys” coming up the hill asking where they can buy drugs. (...) It seems that our peace has ended!”.

As we have mentioned, an atmosphere of even greater indetermination has appeared with the conclusion of the Olympic Games and the departure of the secretary of public safety who commanded the implementation of the pacification project. In October 2016, Beltrame left the government after ten years as secretary of public safety. He justified his decision to leave as the end of a cycle.

Soon after Beltrame’s departure, two episodes marked the end of this cycle. In November 2016, youths involved with the location set fire to one of the offices of the police pacification units of the “model favela”, after a conflict with police that worked on the hill. In the same month, the armed conflicts between police and traffickers in the Cidade de Deus became headlines in Brazilian and international newspapers, after a military police helicopter crashed in a favela during an operation. After this, more than seven people were

killed by the special operations forces in the region considered as the most violent in the Cidade de Deus, Karatê. The expectation among residents is that the logic of violent incursions will return. As one youth from the favela asserted: “The UPP is still there, like make-up, and once in a while they come in here with an operation”. He emphasized that “the civil police come, the special operations battalion, they kill lots of people, ban the dances, but a week later its all the same. We have no more hope”.

Final Considerations

Indefinition now prevails. Nevertheless, we believe that some trends can be identified. The recurring use of the white armored vehicles – announced as the last great “novelty of the UPPs” in late 2016 – an increasingly aggressive position of the “pacification” police and the intervention of federal troops in Rio de Janeiro that began in 2017, only reveal the inability of the “pacification” project to continue the initial plan for “proximity policing”. Going against this concept, there has been a clear (re)intensification of the logic of war.

It should be remembered that since the beginning of the project, even when it still had a relative consensus concerning its success, there was always a critique of the idea of a “proximity policing”. The portion of the population identified with more repressive agendas and associated to the political spectrum of the “right”, as well as a large portion of the police, never stopped criticizing the role of the police. This critique appeared for instance when to come closer to residents of the pacified territories, police officers took on the functions of physical therapists, martial arts teachers, and even dancers at traditional 15-year-old girls’ birthday parties. It was said at the time that the police pacification units were not very repressive and did nothing more than “modernize the trafficking”, actually allowing certain traffickers to remain in the favela and maintain points of sale of drugs (avoiding the entrance of rivals).

In keeping with a sociology of critique, it is possible to suggest that this critical repertoire that always called for more repression and violence, and was partially overcome in 2007, remained latent and now appears to have been renovated. In the current situation, in which the “pacification” project no longer offers a “light at the end of the tunnel”, it is undeniable that the critical energies that called for the effective use of violence and repression in fighting the traffickers have once again seen their proposed solution gain prominence. It is not by chance that certain people have gained impressive electoral importance, such as federal congressional deputy Jair Bolsonaro, who had the highest number of votes in the 2014 elections: 464 thousand.

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25 Police have acted in a truculent manner with residents. For example, they have invaded the houses of favela residents to use their outdoor slabs to confront and attack traffickers This problem has become so recurrent that in April 2017, a public hearing was held by the State Public Defender. The objective was to denounce and debate cases of invasions of homes in the Complex of Alemão by the state military police – a case that, although it had not been debated or denounced by the defender’s office, had occurred frequently in Santa Marta and above all in the Cidade de Deus. The police present at the hearing alleged that since they are in a “moment of war”, they have orders from superiors to remain (even if illegally) in the homes. They even say that they will only stop using spaces in private homes as bases after the installation of new armored bases in the favela.
26 At a press conference on 28 July 2017 Minister of Defense Raul Jungmann, affirmed that ten thousand soldiers had come to reinforce security in Rio until Dec. 31, 2017. The announcement was made after President Michel Temer authorized the use of the armed forces to “Guarantee law and order in Rio de Janeiro state”. The presidential decree was published in a special edition of the Diário Oficial da União (DOU).
27 It should be emphasized that in August 2017, the end of the Pacification Police Units was indirectly decreed, given that 3,000 state military police were shifted from the Pacification Police Units to street patrols in the capital and the Rio de Janeiro metropolitan region. This means that the project had its ranks reduced by 33%. This reduction appears to be the result of two different critiques. One comes from the city’s middle class that indicated that the concentration of a large police force in the favelas limited policing on the city streets. Another came from the police itself who were unhappy working in the favelas and asked to leave the Pacification Police Unit to work in the traditional battalions. This measure obviously weakened the project given that it affected one of the pillars of the program, which was the relative autonomy of the Pacification Police Unit, that had sought not only an administrative separation, but also a moral one in relation to the battalions – which were considered to be contaminated by the “old police” logic.
To conclude, it is necessary to make clear that in 2007 under Beltrame, the security policy partially incorporated critiques of the logic of war and of violent incursions, thus producing the proximity policing. It now appears that Beltrame’s successor, Roberto Sá, a former soldier from the special operations battalion BOPE, has, in his mode of operation, made a partial incorporation of the critical repressive, violent repertoire, and is nourished by many of the elements associated to the war metaphor. This can be seen both in the recurring incursions and operations and in the posture of the pacification police from the UPPs who, as recently reported in the news, have occupied and invaded residents houses in “pacified” favelas without permission – in addition to committing other human rights violations. The war context has allowed both sides – traffickers and the police – to justify systematic violations of rights by arguing that a state of exception exists.

Our argument is that the analysis of the dialectical nourishment between critique and transformation of the state and of public policies is of extreme validity for “probing” and identifying some points of intelligibility in this universe of indetermination specific to urban violence in Brazil and particularly Rio de Janeiro.

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